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Introduction to the Special Issue in 
Honor of Lloyd Shapley: Seven 
Topics in Game Theory1
by David K. Levine
Lloyd Shapley was my colleague at UCLA for many years; by the time he moved from RAND to 
UCLA he was already a legend – although he never acted the part doing his best to maintain the 
reputation of mathematicians as somewhat idiosyncratic souls. He claimed to me at one time that 
the optimal length of the day was 25 hours and that therefore one should wake up an hour later 
every day – although I do not believe he fully implemented this. 
The purpose of this special issue is to celebrate Lloyd Shapley the legend. We also remember Lloyd 
Shapley the man – and we begin the special issue with a remembrance section collecting together 
some recollections and facts about Lloyd’s career. The bulk of the issue is devoted to current 
research that advances the Shapley research agenda. Our first contribution is Roberto Serrano’s 
“Annotated Bibliography.” We believe this is the most complete guide to Lloyd Shapley’s work 
ever compiled. Lloyd was famous, among other things, for publishing papers – significant ones – in 
obscure places, and in some cases not publishing them at all. Roberto and his research assistants 
have made a heroic effort to track it all down and tell us what it is about. 
In comparison to some Lloyd Shapley was not a prolific writer. Over a career spanning sixty-three 
years his Google h-index is 56 – by contrast a prolific writer such as Jean Tirole over thirty-seven 
years has an h-index of 127. I find looking over the fine papers we have selected that they organize 
themselves into seven topics; and as a result I am going to focus on just seven of his papers. The 
striking fact is that each of these papers has led to a substantial literature of its own including the 
current research reported in this volume. Three of these remarkable contributions are prior to 1960 
and all but one prior to 1970. The remaining contribution – and his third most highly cited paper – 
was written in 1996 showing that Lloyd never did get old.
1. The Shapley Value: Shapley, L. S. (1953). “A value for n-person games.” Contributions to the 
Theory of Games, 2(28), 307-317.
Or as Lloyd called it: “the value.” No – I’m not going to tell you what the Shapley value is – if you 
have to ask you shouldn’t be reading this journal – and anyway Wikipedia has a perfectly usable 
definition. There are 11 theoretical articles in this issue advancing the idea of the Shapley value 
some sixty-four years after Lloyd introduced it. Perhaps less well known is the enormous impact 
that the Shapley value has had on applied work – and in other disciplines such as accounting – and 
we have an additional five articles examining applications of the Shapley value.
The theoretical 11.
1 I am particularly grateful to Ehud Kalai, Peter Shapley, and Jennifer Byrd. Without 
Jennifer’s support this volume never would have happened.
i. “Values for Cooperative Games over Graphs and Games with Inadmissable Coalitions” 
Ziv Hellman and Ron Peretz
The value, like many cooperative equilibrium notions, assumes that all coalitions are equally 
likely. Here the value is generalized to incorporate restrictions on the coalitions that can 
form that arise from the theory of social networks. 
ii. “Decomposition of solutions and the Shapley value decomposition” André Casajus and 
Frank Huettner
There are many axiomatic characterizations of the value: indeed part of its strength lies in 
the robustness and the connections these axiomatic systems bring with other solution 
concepts. Here an axiomatic system of decomposition is introduced that connects the 
Shapley value with the naïve solution measuring the marginal contribution of a player to the 
game. 
iii. “Values for Environments with Externalities – The Average Approach” Ines Macho-
Stadler, David Pérez-Castrillo and David Wettstein 
By measuring the worth of a coalition as a weighted average as its worth over different 
partitions of the players different notions of the value can be extended to characteristic 
function form games. Five such extensions are considered and partially characterized.
iv. “The Stochastic Shapley Value for Coalitional Games with Externalities” Oskar Skibski, 
Tomasz Pawel Michalak and Michael Wooldridge 
This paper also attacks the issue of externalities, albeit along a different dimension. Here the 
problem is analyzed viewing coalition formation as a stochastic process. It is shown that the 
Chinese Restaurant Process leads to a value with desirable properties.
v. “Balanced externalities and the Shapley value” Benjamin McQuillin and Robert Sugden
More on externalities: here a characterization of the Shapley value for a useful class of 
games using an extension of the idea of threat points from bargaining is given.
vi. “The proportional Shapley value and applications” Sylvain Béal, Eric Rémila, Philippe 
Solal and Sylvain Ferrières
The value uses linear weights. Here the theory is extended to endogenous non-linear 
weights. The resulting proportional Shapley value is characterized and shown that to 
proportionally distribute the Harsanyi dividend.
vii. “The balanced contributions property for equal contributors” Koji Yokote, Yukihiko 
Funaki and Takumi Kongo
The value here is extended in another new direction with an axiom requiring balanced 
contributions only from pairs of players who contribute the same amount to the grand 
coalition. This leads to the new concept of r-egalitarian Shapley values that organizes many 
existing variants of the value.
viii. “Membership Separability: A New Axiomatization of the Shapley Value” Geoffroy de 
Clippel
Here the traditional value axioms are reexamined and strengthened: in particular additivity 
can be replaced by a weaker accounting property.
ix. “Is Shapley Cost Sharing Optimal?” Shahar Dobzinski, Aranyak Mehta, Tim 
Roughgarden and Mukund Sundararajan
Here the implications of the value for mechanism design is analyzed. The budget balance 
cost sharing problem is studied with the objective of minimizing worst case inefficiency. 
The overall conclusion is that for a class of important problems the value does a good job.
x. “Games of Threats” Abraham Neyman and Elon Kohlberg
In a game of threats the failure to reach agreement need not lead to zero value as is the case 
in a coalitional game. Never-the-less there is an analog of the Shapley axioms that determine 
a unique value and has properties similar to those of the value for coalitional games. 
xi. “The Shapley Value of conjunctive-restricted Games” Jean Derks
Conjunctive-restricted games allow situations such as hierarchies where a subset of players 
controls a larger set. Here Shapley’s methods are extended to study these types of games.
The applied five:
i. “Fair Representation and a Linear Shapley Rule” Sascha Kurz, Nicola Maaser and Stefan 
Napel
The Penrose square root rule is a benchmark for “fair representation.” When there are 
intervals of alternatives with single-peaked preferences and a positive correlation of local 
voters the Penrose rule is shown to be defective and should be replaced with a linear 
Shapley rule.
ii. “A note on the Shapley value for airport cost pooling game” Dongshuang Hou, Hao Sun, 
Panfei Sun and Theo Driessen
The airport cost pooling game is a generalization of the airport game. Here it is shown how 
to compute the value. The value is then characterized using the property that for any pair of 
airplanes from different airlines the loss of withdrawal is the same for each.
iii. “Shapley Value Based Pricing for Auctions and Exchanges” Luke Lindsay
In order to apply the value to auctions and exchanges the standard value is modified so that 
the losers do not pay. This leads to a new set of rules for multiple item auctions which is 
compared to existing solutions.
iv. “Polluted River Problems and Games with a Permission Structure” Rene van den Brink, 
Simin He and Jia-Ping Huang 
This deals with externalities in a more applied setting: how should the costs for cleaning a 
river be shared among the regions through which it passes? Attacking this problem using the 
value leads to new insights including the Upstream Limited Sharing method.
v. “Valuing Inputs Under Supply Uncertainty: The Bayesian Shapley Value” Roland Pongou 
and Jean-Baptiste Tondji
The problem of valuing inputs in an uncertain production environment is examined using 
axiomatic methods. This leads to the a priori Shapley value or the Bayesian Shapley value 
depending on the information structure. The theory is illustrated with an application to 
fidelity networks.
2. The Assignment Problem: Gale, David, and Lloyd S. Shapley. “College admissions and the 
stability of marriage.” The American Mathematical Monthly 69.1 (1962): 9-15.
This is of course Gale and Shapley – some of the unique story behind the writing can be found in 
the remembrances. Again – I’m not going to tell you what the matching problem is – this time 
rather than Wikipedia I will refer you to the Nobel citation. An additional eight articles advance 
Lloyd’s work on the assignment problem.
i. “From the bankruptcy problem and its Concede-and-Divide solution to the assignment 
problem and its Fair Division solution” Christian Trudeau
Here the equivalence between sharing methods is studied.
ii. “The Stochastic Stability of Decentralized Matching on a Graph matching” Leonardo 
Boncinelli and Paolo Pin
While here an evolutionary approach is taken to matching. 
iii. “The Stable Fixtures Problem with Payments” Peter Biro, Walter Kern, Daniel Paulusma 
and Peter Wojuteczky
We continue here with matching on graphs. This contribution furthers the study of multiple 
partner matching games. Algorithmic convergence time is given.
iv. “Competitive Equilibria in School Assignment” Umut Dur and Thayer Morrill
Shapley and Scarf developed top trading cycles to solve the competitive equilibrium 
problem of a market where buyers are matched to homes. Here the idea is extended to the 
school assignment problem.
(have not received final paper yet) v. “Lone wolves in infinite, discrete matching markets” 
Ravi Jagadeesan
The problem of moving from finite to infinite matching markets is studied. A key fact that 
the unmatched agents are the same in all stable outcomes fails – but never-the-less the 
deferred acceptance mechanism is often strategy proof.
(connected to missing paper) vi “Strategy-Proofness of Worker-Optimal Matching with 
Continuously Transferable Utility” Ravi Jagadeesan, Duke Kominers and Ross Rheingans-
Yoo
As the title says: the proof uses the new “lone wolf” theorem from the previous contribution.
vii. “Limited Choice in College Admissions: An Experimental Study” Wei-Cheng Chen, Yi-
Yi Chen and Yi-Cheng Kao
The matching literature has had an enormous impact on applied research. Consequently it is 
much studied in the laboratory and empirically. Here different institutions for limiting 
students’ choice sets are studied in the laboratory. The implications of limiting multiple 
applications – and possible welfare improvements are shown.
vii. “Suboptimal Behavior in Strategy-Proof Mechanisms: Evidence from the Residency 
Match” Alex Rees-Jones
Our final contribution to matching is an empirical study. Data from the medical residency 
matching is used – and it seems that “students pursue futile attempts at strategic 
misrepresentation.”
3. Potential Games: Monderer, Dov, and Lloyd S. Shapley. “Potential games.” Games and 
Economic Behavior 14.1 (1996): 124-143.
I do have this in the right place: this is Lloyd’s third most highly cited work. (Lloyd has a Google 
Scholar page of his own.) It was published right here in Games and Economic Behavior – although 
Ehud Kalai tells me he was inclined to reject it on the grounds he had no idea what use it might 
have. Equilibria in potential games have special properties – not least of which is that they have 
strong stability properties with respect to learning. This is a “Lloyd could see the future where the 
rest of us could not” example: these games are useful because there are a surprising lot of them 
although you would not think so from the definition. I am pleased that we have a few recent 
contributions to the literature on potential games in this volume.
i. “A universal construction generating potential games” Nikolai S. Kukushkin
One problem with potential games is figuring out which games have potentials. Here a novel 
method is introduced extending the idea that congestion games have potentials to a broader 
class of games with structured utilities.
ii. “Nonatomic Potential Games: the Continuous Strategy Case” Man Wah Cheung and 
Ratul Lahkar
Large games – either large populations or large strategy sets or both – are of tremendous 
importance in economics. Hence the non-atomic model of agents and continuous strategy 
spaces. This contribution shows how potentials can be used to analyze these large games.
4. Power Index: Shapley, L.S., Shubik, M., 1954. “A method for evaluating the distribution of 
power in a committee system.” Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev. 48, 787–792
The Banzhaf power index was invented by Lionel Penrose in 1946: it measures the power of a voter 
by the probability of being the decisive voter in a winning coalition. This anticipates some of the 
key ideas of the Shapley value and Shapley and Shubik subsequently developed a power index 
more consonant with the value and studied it and the Banzhaf index in a series of papers. Three of 
our contributions advance the study of Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik power indices.
i. “Effectivity and Power” Dominik Karos and Hans Peters
An important theme of this volume is the extension of existing methods – generally those 
developed by Shapley – to a broader class of games. This paper is in that vein – by 
extending the class of games for which power indices are defined it becomes possible to 
apply the theory to examples such as that of the U.S. legislative system that previously 
defied analysis.
(haven’t received final paper yet)ii. “The Conditional Shapley-Shubik measure for Ternary 
Voting Games” Jane Friedman and Cameron Parker
Continuing to extend the power index idea, this contribution studied games where in 
addition to voting yes or no it is possible to abstain.
iii. “The Axiom of Equivalence to Individual Power and the Banzhaf Index” Ori Haimanko
Here the axiomatic approach to power indices is applied – and used to give a new 
characterization of the Banzhaf power index
4. Learning in Games: Shapley, Lloyd S. "Some topics in two-person games." Advances in Game 
Theory 52.1-29 (1964): 1-2.
You knew I was coming to this one, right? You probably would not guess from the rather bland title 
that one of the topics in two-person games is an extremely robust example of a simple learning 
procedure (fictitious play) that converges to a cycle – it is in fact the famous game of rock-paper-
scissors. This has played a key role in my own work with Drew Fudenberg on learning in games, 
and continues to play an important role in our understanding of the convergence and divergence of 
learning processes. Two of the contributions here advance the agenda of studying convergence and 
divergence of learning processes.
i. “The Query Complexity of Correlated Equilibria” Sergiu Hart and Noam Nisan
The classical Shapley problem of cycles is avoided in modern learning theory by stochastic 
dynamics. The key point here is that this is in fact necessary.
ii. “Approachability of convex sets in generalized quitting games” János Flesch, Rida Laraki 
and Vianney Perchet
The key technical tool in studying the stochastic dynamics and showing that they avoid the 
classical Shapley problem is Blackwell approachability. Here we find simple geometric 
conditions for approachability in an important class of games.
5. Market Games: Shapley, Lloyd S., and Martin Shubik. "On market games." Journal of Economic 
Theory 1.1 (1969): 9-25.
You probably associate the study of market games with Martin Shubik rather than Lloyd Shapley, 
but in the early years the two of them did extensive joint work on these games. The topic is still 
going strong: we have four papers on the topic in this issue, two of them co-authored by Martin 
Shubik.
i. “Money as Minimal Complexity” Pradeep Dubey, Siddhartha Sahi and Martin Shubik
A graph theoretical approach to markets is taken and three key graphs are identified: the star, 
the cycle and the complete graphs. The star mechanism stands out because there is a single 
money used in every transaction and this mechanism has a minimality property.
ii. “Graphical Exchange Mechanisms” Pradeep Dubey, Siddhartha Sahi and Martin Shubik
This paper is the theoretical underpinning of “Money as Minimal Complexity” laying out 
carefully what graphical exchange mechanisms are and the definition of minimal 
complexity.
iii. “Shapley’s Conjecture on the Cores of Abstract Market Games” Zhigang Cao, 
Chengzhong Qin and Xiao-guang Yang
I’m going to quote the abstract here as it does a particularly good job of explaining this 
paper: “Shapley (1955) introduced the model of an abstract market game as a generalization 
of the assignment game model, among several other models. He conjectured that abstract 
market games possess non-empty cores. We analyze properties of abstract market games and 
provide a proof of this conjecture for cases with four or fewer players. We show by example 
that, in general, the structure of an abstract market game is not strong enough to guarantee 
the nonemptiness of the core. We establish supplemental conditions for the conjecture to 
hold. Our supplemental conditions are satisfied by the assignment games and abstract 
market games with one side consisting of a single player as with package auction games 
in Ausubel and Milgrom (2002).”
iv. “Noncooperative Oligopoly in Markets with a Continuum of Traders and a Strongly 
Connected Set of Commodities” Francesca Busetto, Giulio Codognato, Sayantan Ghosal, 
Ludovic Julien and Simone Tonin
Here the Shapley trading window model is studied where there are both large and small 
traders: a significant weakening in the conditions for existence of equilibrium can be 
established.
6. Stochastic Games: Shapley, Lloyd S. “Stochastic games.” Proceedings of the National Academy 
of Sciences 39.10 (1953): 1095-1100.
Yes, he invented these as well. We have two papers studying zero-sum stochastic games – although 
in recent years the study of non-zero sum stochastic games has become a thing.
i. “Tauberian theorems for general iterations of operators” Bruno Ziliotto
Tauberian theorems assert that the finite time averages converge uniformly if and only if the 
discounted payoffs converge uniformly as the discount factor approaches one. Here several 
theorems are proven and applied to the study of values and strategies in zero sum stochastic 
games.
ii. “Zero-sum Revision Games” Fabien Gensbittel, Stefano Lovo, Jérôme Renault and 
Tristan Tomala
Again a good abstract: “In zero-sum asynchronous revision games, players revise their 
actions only at exogenous random times. Players’ revision times follow Poisson processes, 
independent across players. Payoffs are obtained only at the deadline by implementing the 
last prepared actions in the ‘component game’. We characterize the value of this game as the 
unique solution of an ordinary differential equation.” The results are then applied to analyze 
particular classes of games.
iii. “Acceptable Strategy Profiles in Stochastic Games” Eilon Solan
Also known as “satisficing meets Lloyd Shapley” this one is not for zero sum games. Here 
players have utility targets and conditions under which simple strategies enable them all to 
achieve high targets are given.
7. The Core: L.S. Shapley, M. Shubik. “The core of an economy with nonconvex preferences,” 
Rand Corporation, 1963
He was one of the greatest game theorists of all time: of course he wrote about the core. Here are 
two current papers advancing that research.
i. “On a class of vertices of the core” Michel Grabisch and Peter Sudhölter
This advances Lloyd’s geometrical methods and shows that there are balanced games whose 
core has vertices which are not min–max vertices if and only if there are at least four 
players.
ii. “Competitive Pricing and the Core: with Special Reference to Matching” Joseph Ostroy
Here the idea of subdifferentiability is used to unify Shapley’s contributions to the theory of 
the core with his work on matching.
8. Additional Topics:
While Lloyd was not prolific he did contribute in many areas. A few of our contributions do not fit 
into the “big” Shapley topics but are never-the-less significant papers in their own right.
Shapley, L. S. (1963). Solutions of compound simple games. Advances in Game Theory, (52), 267-
280.
Games are simple if coalitions either win or lose and these can be combined into larger games. 
Shapley, Lloyd S., and Martin Shubik. "Pure competition, coalitional power, and fair division." 
International Economic Review 10.3 (1969): 337-362.
“Fair Stable Sets of Simple Games” Eduard Talamas
This contribution advances both the work on simple games and on fair division, describing 
how to construct fair stable sets for compound simple games. 
Our final contributions are even more eclectic.
“Coalition Preferences with Individual Prospects” Manel Baucells and Dov Samet
Earler work by Baucells and Shapley (2008) gave conditions under which coalitions have 
complete preferences. This finishes that work by providing simpler and weaker conditions.
“Three Little-Known and yet Still Significant Contributions of Lloyd Shapley” Jingang 
Zhao
This paper tracks down the history of some earlier contributions of Lloyd’s. 
“Lloyd Shapley and Chess with Imperfect Information” Alexander Matros
Those who knew Lloyd knew his love of Kriegsspiel – chess where the opponents’ moves 
are hidden. To wrap up our issue we have a game theoretic study of some problems in 
Kriegsspiel.
Some Remembrances of Lloyd
Lloyd and Me
By Peter Shapley
There’s been plenty said about Lloyd’s mathematical achievements, thankfully a lot of it 
before his death when he could enjoy it, so I won’t dwell on them.
Lloyd was my father, and father to my brother Chip. When growing up, I often was asked 
what my father did for a living. “He’s a mathematician,” I said. It seemed to me to be as normal an 
occupation as a doctor or an engineer or a plumber or an auto mechanic. But it wasn’t.
A few years ago, Lloyd’s nephew Mel mentioned that whenever he visited our house, there 
were puzzles – logic puzzles – and games all around. They weren’t really for Chip and me, they 
were my father’s toys, toys he had because he wanted constant logical stimulation. And that rubbed 
off on both of us, steering us in the scientific direction in our educations and careers.
But Lloyd wasn’t just limited to pure logical exercises, he was interested in all forms of 
knowledge, from history and literature to geology. When my mother Marian went back to school in 
her fifties, eventually earning advanced degrees in linguistics, Lloyd learned enough of that field to 
understand what was going on, and he was able to serve as an outside member on the dissertation 
committee of Marian’s classmate and friend – and now my wife – Feng-hsi.
And Lloyd loved music. He was an accomplished pianist, though he personally never felt he 
was all that good. But he enjoyed playing his old Steinway. He loved going to concerts, when he 
could get to them – in his later years, the local Palisades Symphony performances were a highlight, 
and I remember vividly how excited he was during and after the Nobel concert in Stockholm.
Besides all that, Lloyd enjoyed the outdoors. My parents’ courtship was largely based in 
Yosemite, and from the time I was about ten, we made regular trips up there. He also did a number 
of campouts with Chip and me when we were in Boy Scouts. The trips to Yosemite with Marian 
continued after we were grown and moved out, even though the two of them were regularly 
traveling all over the world. I don’t think, however, that he returned to Yosemite after Marian passed 
away. But he was very happy several years ago when I gave him a photo we had taken of my son 
Ricky on a hike up there.
And Lloyd was a baseball fan. He grew up a Red Sox fan, though he adopted the Dodgers 
when they followed him to California. Baseball, with all the statistics and strategy, appealed to him 
much more than other sports, and the Dodgers, as a pretty good team, made it easy to follow the 
game all season long, year after year. But he was thrilled when, at the age of 81, he was finally able 
to see his Red Sox win the World Series. 
I miss talking baseball with my father, but what I really miss is doing all sorts of things with 
him, talking to him about anything, science or history or whatever construction project he was 
working on. His sense of humor, whether it was subtle wordplay or horrible puns, his knowledge of 
seemingly everything. From talking to his friends and colleagues and especially family over the past 
few months, the past couple of years, I’m not the only one who feels that way.
Lloyd wasn’t given to sentiment, but his ties to his family were very strong indeed, and we 
all miss him.
The King and Lloyd
By Alvin E. Roth
My first long conversation with Lloyd was when I visited him in 1974, having just finished 
my Ph.D. dissertation. I made what felt like a pilgrimage to see him at the RAND Corporation in 
Santa Monica, to tell him about my work.  
My last long conversations with Lloyd were in December, 2012, when we both attended the 
Nobel Prize celebrations in Stockholm. A careful observer might have noted that we had both aged 
a little since our first meeting. Lloyd walked with a cane, and that led to a small bit of logistics. 
When you receive the Nobel from the King of Sweden, the King presents you with two packages, 
containing the diploma and the medal, which you hold with your left hand so that the two of you 
can shake hands. Lloyd was concerned about how he would manage this with his cane, and so we 
agreed that I would walk with him and hold his cane while he received the packages and shook 
hands, and return it to him immediately afterwards. Hence the picture below.
A subsequent encounter with the King had a touch of game theory. The night after the 
awards ceremony (and a very big dinner party in the City Hall) there is another dinner party in the 
royal palace, followed by a reception. At some point Lloyd was fatigued and ready to return to the 
hotel. But royal protocol dictates that no one should leave before the King, and that when the King 
leaves the party is over, and everyone leaves. So if the King had been told that one of his guests of 
honor was ready to go home, he would have felt obliged to depart and end the party to make this 
possible. To avoid ending the party prematurely, Lloyd therefore exited through the kitchen with the 
help of palace staff, without passing by the King and without alerting him and disrupting the party.  
I thought it very appropriate that he exited with this small game-theoretic flourish. 
Experimental Lloyd
By David K. Levine
I have a near infinite supply of Shapley stories – not to speak of unspeakable gratitude for the many 
kindnesses which he did for me. One story sticks in my mind and although I cannot verify its 
authenticity this is a volume about Lloyd the legend so I will tell it anyway. The story is this: in the 
early days of the RAND corporation a number of experiments were carried out on group decision 
making. The goal was to discover what was the best number of people to have in a group in order to 
quickly solve a difficult problem. A number of groups were organized and each was given a time 
limit, a mathematical problem too difficult to solve within the time limit, and the group was asked 
to provide their best guess of the answer. It seems that the number of people in the group made no 
difference – the only thing that mattered whether Lloyd was in the group. No matter how many 
others there were if Lloyd was their they got (more or less) the right answer – and not otherwise.
Gale and Shapley
By David K. Levine and Peter Shapley
One of Lloyd’s most celebrated works is his paper with David Gale “College admissions and 
the stability of marriage” published in that great journal of economic theory The American 
Mathematical Monthly in 1962. The circumstances surrounding the writing of that paper are 
legendary – and like most legends the reality is somewhat obscure. Lloyd’s son Peter Shapley has 
been able to locate the original correspondence between Lloyd and David and with Peter’s 
permission we are now in a position to verify that many of the rumors are true. 
Our first document is the statement of the problem sent originally from David to Lloyd. 
Lloyd received David’s letter at noon and sent off the reply by 4:00 the same day. Our second 
document is that reply. It is remarkable that so short a letter should result in a Nobel prize – not to 
say have such an impact on our thinking and on our lives. Our third document is David’s reply to 
Lloyd. We reproduce also Lloyd’s reply – in effect happy to let David do the writing!
The paper was “reject and resubmit”: according to Lloyd the paper was rejected by two 
referees but kept alive by a kind act of the editor. We do not, unfortunately, have the reports or 
editor’s letter, but we do have Lloyd’s letter to David Gale, our document five. Fortunately it seems 
they were inclined to resubmit. 
We have reproduced also the final page from the second draft of the paper: a spirited defense 
of mathematics.
There is an old joke about mathematicians that is apropos: A mathematician is sitting in his 
office, working. He smells smoke. He goes out and sees a fire has started in the kitchen. He knows 
there’s a sink and a bucket, so he knows how to put the fire out. Problem solved. So he goes back to 
his office to get back to his real work. Lloyd did pretty much the same thing. He solved the college 
admissions problem back in 1960, then went back to his real work. Problem solved. He let David 
write it up, and it wasn’t until 30 years later that Al Roth actually applied the solution to the real 
world. At least the house didn’t burn down in the meantime.





